

# INTEGRATED URBAN HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

INTEGRATED, MULTI-SECTORAL AND SECTORAL URBAN  
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN KENYA

WORKING PAPER 2  
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Kenya's urban population is growing rapidly. The share of the urban population in 1997 was 20.9% out of the national population of 28.1 million as compared to 5.1 % at the time of the first population census in 1948. The most pressing issues faced by this population had been identified by the National Report and Plan of Action on Shelter and Human Settlements to include poverty, unemployment, poor access to land, energy and basic infrastructure and services. These problems have immensely accentuated the vulnerability of low-income families, who increasingly find themselves living in health and life threatening livelihood conditions. In order to address these issues development organizations are moving towards holistic, poverty focused interventions notwithstanding the fact that many developing countries such as Kenya address development issues in practice from the standpoint of selected industries or sectors (agriculture, education, employment, health, etc). This pattern can also be seen at the regional and international levels where multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies as well as NGOs support programmes and projects in terms of sectors, largely because the issues and problems prompting requests for assistance are rooted in specific sectors. However, sectoral approaches have been found deficient in dealing with multi-sector issues such as HIV/AIDS or gender issues that cut across more than one sector.

Other development approaches that have been used to redress the shortcomings in the sectoral approach have included multi-sectoral and integrated development. In the multisectoral development all strategic partners determine how the programme affects issues within their own sector's purview, and how it is likely to affect their own sector's plans, objectives and goals in the future. A multisectoral approach requires that this kind of analysis, priority setting and planning takes place across all sectors when the programme is being conceived. The basic concept inherent in the multi-sectoral approach is the decentralization of responsibility and resources, both human and financial, to community-level organizations. In this approach, governmental and non-governmental institutional and outreach rehabilitation services must support community initiatives and organizations. Although multi-sectoral approach to development is participatory and decentralised in management and execution it is single-goal oriented since all sectors and disciplines involved are striving to solve the same problem and so it is not holistic. On the other hand, integrated development involves several issues in one project whose implementation may not only be multi-sectoral but also multi-and inter-disciplinary. While it shares features of participation, decentralisation and multi-disciplinarity with multi-sectoral approach its main distinguishing feature lies in the multi-goals or packages within a project or several projects to a target population, as well as involving participation of target groups in setting preferences in what would improve their living conditions at the planning stage.

Despite the above and many other development paradigms to-date many development agencies have recorded limited success in eliminating poverty. As a result, new ideas are emerging about development, and several agencies such as International Institute for Sustainable Development, DFID, UNDP, etc., are revising their strategies and placing greater emphasis on elimination of poverty through the concept of sustainable livelihoods(SL). Conceptually, livelihoods connote the activities, entitlements and assets by which people make a living, and the approach to SL is a process rather than a methodology with various iterative stages and feedback to the various component parts. The key element of the livelihoods concept is that people are the starting point. It recognises that households need access to assets so as to provide for their basic needs and to gradually increase them

over time. These assets help buffer households against shocks and stresses such as ill-health or unemployment, but there are barriers or influences (structures and processes) that hinder access to assets, therefore the degree to which the households can sustainably withstand shocks and stresses. While the SL principles incorporate and complement key tenets of other development approaches already described, SL encourages sectoral goals to be defined and designated in terms of impacts on people (empowerment, participation, health, etc) rather than simple direct outputs of money or physical assets. Understanding the impact of development on the well-being of the poor beyond money or physical assets is therefore of interest to governments and other development partners.

The above development concepts were used to evaluate the impact on livelihoods of some eight urban shelter development projects in Kenya including the First Urban Project initiated in Nairobi in 1975 through the Third Urban Project initiated in 1983 to the more recent Enabling Housing Standards and Procedures Project (EHSP) initiated in 1996. The general observation was that most shelter development projects in Kenya have not only been sectoral but also non-participatory. Urban development planning has so far been characterised by what has been described as the **“spread-and-take-up programmes”**, **“at the table projects”** or **“top-down development”** where services are pushed out from the centre and are taken up by the periphery without reflecting the residents’ aspirations. Within this context the political elites and experts normally make the major decisions regarding what is desirable and community participation is normally minimal and only as a means of legitimising what has already been decided upon. Potential inputs from those beneficiaries likely to benefit most are therefore ignored.

The result has often been a high turnover among the initially targeted beneficiaries; tensions between communities and development agencies; and weak implementation capacity at all levels. This has been the case with six out of eight projects described above, where majority occupants of the housing units are not original allottees. The exceptions are the Tanzania-Bondeni Community Lands Trust in Voi and the EHSP Project in Nakuru. Both projects have adopted a participatory approach and created a sense of networking and collaboration among stakeholders. They also involved the examination of the adaptive strategies rather than coping strategies of the target populations. The poor cases of non-participation have been reflected in Kariobangi in Nairobi as well as in Chaani in Mombasa.

Urban shelter development projects in Kenya have also been characterised by weak intersectoral linkages arising from segmented sectoral mandates in the line ministries, local authorities and parastatals as well as weak institutional co-ordination. In all the eight cases analysed there were only two cases of multisectoral projects, one in Voi and another in Nakuru, and the Second Urban Project which was integrated. The remaining five projects were largely sectoral in the way they were initiated and implemented. They were not participatory enough nor were they decentralised. The issues were also very narrowly conceived and the outcomes narrowly defined to take account of sustainable livelihoods. Although the two multi-sector projects were participatory, they also had a single-goal narrowly defined mandate that did not go beyond shelter considerations.

Only the Second Urban Project out of the eight projects above adopted an integrated approach to development as it addressed issues that are of concern to human well-being that were not directly related to shelter including nutrition child health and family planning components. Most of the projects considered income as the point of reference and disregarded other aspects that lead to poverty within communities such as lack of empowerment and participation. Although they targeted the low-income groups, issues of age, gender, and the needs of the particular vulnerable groups such as the elderly, women-headed households, recent migrants and the disabled were often not considered. Thus past government efforts at improving the living conditions of poor urban settlers through site and service schemes and settlement upgrading programmes, for instance, that were meant to be

self-sustaining and replicable, had suffered from typical shortcomings of over-designed and unaffordable infrastructure. This had resulted in the marginalization of the targeted poor and their movement away from the projects; and rampant disregard of community costs.

When the basic needs strategy in favour of the poor was seen not to make headway, the lending policies that came with structural adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s focused more on policy environments rather than poverty. The emphasis was on governments as facilitators, full cost recovery and reduction of subsidies. However, it needs to be appreciated that cost recovery is affected by both the ability of the implementing agency as well as the behaviour of the beneficiary communities. Concern with institutional development should therefore take cognisance of the need to provide for community participation. It is thus necessary to assess the community strengths and assets as well as risks through participation involving all project stakeholders.

It has for a long time been assumed that the two critical factors for sustainable livelihoods for the urban poor in shelter development are income and secure tenure, hence the tendency to define single-goals in most shelter projects. It has only been recently conceded in the wake of sustainable livelihoods concept that other factors or assets and entitlements such as social networks, participation and empowerment, health and nutrition as well as infrastructure and social amenities, etc., are equally important for the total well-being of a person. Thus any form of poverty eradication can only be successful if it is able to describe how people obtain these assets, what they do with them, what gets into their way whilst obtaining them and who controls the resources on which the assets are based. The solutions will rest with the people whose adaptive mechanisms should be harnessed, facilitated and appropriately improved at the intra-household and inter-household levels. It is in this context that this paper encourages the use of the sustainable livelihoods (SL) approaches to development, which though may appear slow and costly in the beginning, are systematic and able to open and heal the wounds of poverty if executed properly.

# 1. INTRODUCTION

The share of Kenya's urban population has grown from 5.1 % at the time of the first population census in 1948, to 20.9% in 1997. Residents in the urban centres face innumerable problems: poverty, unemployment, high cost of conventional building materials, insecure land tenure and poor access to basic infrastructure and services. These problems have immensely accentuated the vulnerability of low-income families, who increasingly find themselves living in health and life threatening livelihood conditions.

Development organizations are moving towards holistic, poverty focused interventions in the face of a reality of sectorally organised approaches with which to interact. NGOs and donors have themselves responded to this reality by organizing their operations along sectoral lines, but with increasing responsiveness to the broader needs expressed by poor stakeholders. Whilst taking a holistic approach to development based on livelihoods approaches, agencies are still likely to focus on particular types of intervention. Understanding the impact of improvements either in income or other assets, is of interest to governments, donors and agencies.

On a pilot basis the Intermediate Technology Development Group (Eastern Africa Region) is currently working with low-income groups in Kwa Rhonda, Lakeview and Bondeni settlement areas within the Municipal Council of Nakuru on the Integrated Urban Housing Project (IUHP). The goal of IUHP is to increase the access of the low-income households and the poor to adequate safe and secure shelter. The project purpose is to identify and promote a sustainable shelter delivery strategy for the urban poor which can be adopted by governments in Kenya and elsewhere.

The IUHP is one of the Knowledge and Research (KAR) projects supported by the Department for International Development (DFID). Projects of this nature place emphasis on production of case studies and research papers on context, patterns and trends pertaining to shelter and urban development programming. This is done primarily to inform practitioner audiences (professionals, governments, academic institutions, and international movements) and, to influence policy change in support of the urban poor.

Within the context of IUHP and in the light of changing concepts in urban development arena, with shifts from sectoral and multi-sectoral projects to integrated projects as a basis for sustainable livelihoods, ITDG-Eastern Africa commissioned this paper to carry out a review of approaches, processes and impacts of integrated, multi-sectoral and sectoral urban development projects in Kenya. With a bias towards access to adequate and secure shelter, the literature search should principally focus on the following three facets:

- (a) Policy frameworks, emerging trends and patterns of integrated and multi-sectoral urban development vis-à-vis sectoral projects in Kenya;
- (b) Profiles of selected integrated, multi-sectoral and sectoral projects;
- (c) The impacts of integrated, multi-sectoral and sectoral projects (using yardsticks derived from the Sustainable Livelihood Framework).

## 2. REVIEW OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT CONCEPTS

Development organizations are moving towards holistic, poverty focused interventions but face a reality of sectorally organised approaches with which to interact. NGOs and donors have themselves responded to this reality by organizing their operations along sectoral lines, but with increasing responsiveness to the broader needs expressed by poor stakeholders. For instance, since 1991 International Institute for Sustainable

Development (IISD) under its Community Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods (CASL) program has been trying to understand the complex livelihoods of rural people in less-developed countries. Its efforts aim to answer how people in the developing world can escape from poverty and build a sustainable future for their children. The program began by creating a framework to define what is needed to sustain rural livelihoods: an integration of community knowledge, appropriate technologies, access to credit, and enabling policies (IISD, 1999). This work led to a more holistic understanding of community development and also revealed important factors that constrain communities from participating effectively in policy and investment decisions.

Other agencies, notably UNDP, DFID, CARE and Oxfam have in the recent past adopted in their development programmes the Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) approach which presents a tool for understanding how households live (Ashley and Carney, 1999; Sanderson, 2000). The development of sustainable livelihoods is a complex policy issue not only because factors affecting them are numerous, varied and interdependent, but also changing. While there are commonalities across cases of livelihoods worldwide, it is not possible to prescribe a standard one-size-fits all approach for sustainable livelihoods. A key aspect of SL and other livelihoods approaches is the role that assets play in strengthening households. It describes how people obtain “assets”, what they do with them, what gets into their way whilst obtaining them and who controls the resources on which assets are based. This section examines the various development approaches in practice and to what extent they can be regarded as holistically embracing the sustainable livelihood concerns.

## **2.1 Sectoral development approach**

Many developing countries address national development issues such as agriculture, education, employment and health in practice from the standpoint of selected industries or sectors. Thus the development structures in Kenya, for instance, such as government ministries and departments are sectorally established. This pattern can also be seen at the regional and international levels where multi-lateral and bi-lateral agencies as well as NGOs support programmes and projects in terms of sectors. In large part this is because the issues and problems prompting requests for assistance are rooted in specific sectors. In most cases, policy or programme measures envisaged will gain greatly in concreteness and applicability when discussed in the context of a specific industry or service. However, sectoral approaches have been found deficient in dealing with multi-sector issues such as HIV/AIDS or gender issues that cut across more than one sector.

Sectoral programmes such as shelter have suffered in Kenya due to the multiplicity of institutions involved with providing land, issuance of development approvals, supply of power, etc. A typical case was the Second Urban Project funded by the World Bank to provide low cost housing in the three major cities of Nairobi, Mombasa and Kisumu that had to delay for years due to the inability of Ministry of Lands and Settlement to make land available for the project on time, particularly in Kisumu (Saad Yahya and Associates, 1988). This led to high cost overruns, which made the project unaffordable by the target group. In Kenya this arises due to lack of co-ordination at an early stage by the executing agency. Quite often the other agencies are only informed when the first meeting is called to discuss the implementation. They are not involved in the proposal writing and therefore do not own the project, and indeed would not give it a priority. However, there still remains a valid reason for taking a sectoral approach to development because of limited resources relative to the existing or potential demands. It is thus sometimes more practical and cost-effective to limit resources to selected sectors where the problem is acute and the conditions are promising for getting results than to spread the available resources over a large part of the economy. What is therefore needed in the Kenyan context is that as much as projects must be initiated sectorally, it is important to identify those strategic partners whose services will

be required and bring them on board at initial stages as consultants or service providers, playing a support role for the particular sector. In other words, sectoral approach can be multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary but sectoral and linear in management planning and execution, since the support sectors do not own the project.

## **2.2 Multi-sectoral development approach**

Multisectoralism does not mean simply other sectors in a support role for a master plan or other ministries finding ways to support another ministry's response to a programme such as shelter provision. Rather it means all strategic partners determining how the programme affects issues within their own sector's purview, and how it is likely to affect their own sector's plans, objectives and goals in the future. A multisectoral approach requires that this kind of analysis, priority setting and planning takes place across all sectors when the programme is being conceived. A multisectoral approach for shelter should incorporate other sectors dealing for instance, with poverty alleviation, environmental degradation, urban growth and policy, gender, economic power imbalances, economic and social marginalization, development of community responses and participation, and capacity building for sustainability. The development of the program plan should be done through an open, participatory and inclusive process, involving all parties concerned - government ministries, NGOs, the private sector and communities. It should particularly recognize that people targeted, as beneficiaries possess the key elements of response and should be involved at all levels and phases of plan development.

For instance, the need for a multi-sectoral strategy was foreseen at the inception of the National AIDS Control Program in Kenya in 1987. However, an appropriate framework for full realisation of this strategy has been lacking (GK, 1997). The Ministry of Health has not been able to marshal other sectors involved in AIDS prevention and control. Lengthy and complicated bureaucratic procedures at the Ministry of Health headquarters inhibit the smooth flow of funds for initiatives at the provincial and district levels. Effective district inter-sectoral AIDS committees are few and where they exist lack capacity to implement an effective HIV prevention program. This realization led to the establishment of National AIDS Council (NAC) in November, 1999. The rationale is that the National AIDS Council will expedite HIV prevention and control activities through formulation of appropriate policies; establishment of appropriate institutional framework for a multi-sectoral AIDS control program; strengthening of institutional capacity at all levels; leadership in resource mobilization for AIDS control including care of people affected and co-ordination of all actors which include government departments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), community based organizations (CBOs), religious organizations, private sector, and donors among others(GK,1999).

The basic concept inherent in the multi-sectoral approach is the decentralization of responsibility and resources, both human and financial, to community-level organizations. In this approach, governmental and non-governmental institutional and outreach rehabilitation services must support community initiatives and organizations. Of special importance is improvement of the capacity and skills for facilitating community involvement. Another factor is the empowerment of the community to assume responsibility for ensuring that all its members, including those with disabilities, achieve equal access to all of the resources that are available to that community, and that they are enabled to participate fully in the social, economic and political life of the community. These two important elements would ensure that what is done in the name of a target population actually fits into the reality of the community and is owned by the community.

Thus multi-sectoral approach to development though participatory and decentralised in management and execution is single-goal oriented since all sectors and disciplines

involved are striving to solve the same problem. Thus multi-sectoral approach will require effective coordination, both horizontal (as between the various service providers) and vertical (as between the service providers and policy makers).

### **2.3 Integrated development approach**

When Integrated Rural Development (IRD) was introduced in the development literature during the late 1960s it meant increased attention for the interrelationship between individual aspects of rural development, and a plea for the implementation of packages of mutually reinforcing activities in the rural areas. It called for increased attention for specific target groups like the rural poor, and a preference for stimulating processes of change from below with intensive participation of the local population (Cohen, 1980; Stekenberg, 1989). Thus unlike the multi-sectoral approach in which each sector provides a service towards a similar goal within a programme such as housing, the integrated approach may involve a package of services, issues or different projects in a target population based on their participation and priority setting. Each sector will develop its own sub-project within the programme with different perspectives or goals. This approach has sometimes been abused by particularly some development agencies in Kenya who may decide to go into an area such the semi-arid parts of the country with several uncoordinated projects that overwhelm the capacity of recipients to handle them. Since the 1970s, however, the concept of integrated development has been applied in a variety of situations, in both rural and urban areas, but with emphasis on target groups, particularly the poor. Multi-lateral and bilateral agencies, national governments and non-governmental organisations have sponsored programmes that incorporate integrated activities as a “development package,” which for lack of a better term may be referred to as the “package approach” to development (Syagga, 1998). Some housing development projects in Kenya sponsored by donor agencies in the 1970s and 1980s in the form of serviced sites as well as settlement upgrading programmes specifically targeted at low-income groups, incorporated activities to promote income generation and made provisions for educational and health facilities within the project sites (Lee-Smith and Memon, 1987; Yahya and Associates, 1989). The income-generation concept was incorporated by allowing for development of housing units that were amenable to sub-letting instead of previous developments that allowed for single family units on respective plots, as well as the provision of market stalls for business. The implementation of the projects therefore involved integration of the various services as well as the service providers but did not stimulate processes of change from below with intensive participation of the population. A number of these projects will be examined later to determine to what extent they could be described as integrated projects, or simply sectoral.

In Kenya where planning practice has largely been top-down, integrated development approach has been used to refer to an implementation process that in a single project addresses a package of issues that aim at improving the living conditions of a target group. Solutions to issues are to be implemented simultaneously as an integrated set of activities (Syagga, 1998). Integrated approach involves several issues in one project whose implementation may not only be multi-sectoral but also multi-and inter-disciplinary. Care should be taken that it does not become more of a practice than a concept and should involve participation of target groups in setting preferences in what would improve their living conditions at the planning stage. Thus while integrated approach shares features of participation, decentralisation and multi-disciplinarity with multi-sectoral approach its main distinguishing feature lies in the multi-goals or packages within a project or several projects to a target population. This inevitably raises the question about the efficiency and effectiveness of both horizontal and vertical integration, as well as tools for assessment of performance of various issues that are being integrated.

In all the above three approaches to development, assessing success or failure is based on physical outputs such as numbers of houses, hospital beds and classrooms built rather than the impacts on the living conditions of the target population. The outputs have been regarded as surrogates for human well-being when in effect they may not answer questions of empowerment such as participation, resilience to stress and capacity to overcome calamities. It is thus important that the approaches when used should incorporate in their planning appropriate verifiable indicators for human well-being so that impact assessments can be effectively undertaken for each project.

#### **2.4 Sustainable livelihoods (SL) approaches to development**

The concepts of integrated and multi-sectoral approaches to development remained popular with donor agencies and national governments as a panacea to poverty alleviation until the onset of the concept of “sustainable development” at the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1988) and the Earth Summit (UNCED, 1992). Since then, however, most policies that have been developed with this label are in reality environmental-protection or environmental management policies (Schnur and Holtz, 1998). Although environmental protection is a necessary condition for sustainable development, it is not sufficient to alleviate poverty particularly in the developing countries like Kenya where about 50% of the population live below the poverty line (GK, 2000). Defining the ecological system as the primary system around which other development concerns gravitate could in many respects be tantamount to imposing “elitist” views about environmental issues and blocking progress and human development. A balance must therefore be drawn between ecological, social and economic development goals as no one system is more important than the others. It is therefore important to identify, assess and effectively manage the trade-offs between the ecological and the livelihoods imperatives in any given context.

Despite the many development paradigms to-date many development agencies have recorded limited success in eliminating poverty. As a result, new ideas are emerging about development, and several agencies are revising their strategies and placing greater emphasis on elimination of poverty through the concept of sustainable livelihoods (SL) (Ashley and Carney, 1999; IISD, 1999; Sanderson, 2000). The key element of the livelihoods approaches is that people are the starting point. Conceptually, livelihoods connote the activities, entitlements and assets by which people make a living. SL describes the links between all levels that affect the households, starting from how households secure assets, what they do with them, what gets into their way whilst obtaining them and who controls the resources on which assets are based. It recognises that households need access to assets so as to provide for their basic needs and to gradually increase them over time. These assets help buffer households against shocks and stresses such as ill-health or unemployment. It also recognises that there are barriers or influences (structures and processes) to accessing assets which determine the level of services received as well as quantity of assets built overtime and therefore the degree to which the households can sustainably withstand shocks and stresses. The access to, use of, and interaction among the assets serves as a foundation of a livelihood system. These assets broadly include the following:

**Natural/biological assets:** these are the natural resources upon which livelihoods will in the first instance depend and whose access is crucial to households namely, land, water, flora, fauna, common property resources, etc. For instance, tenure is a key physical asset to acquire. Having a degree of ownership of land is often the starting point for households to consolidate shelter.

**Physical assets:** these include physical infrastructure, particularly roads, markets, clinics, schools, bridges, etc. Properly planned infrastructure and better building reduce

vulnerability to sudden impact of disasters like fire, earthquake, and epidemics related to poor housing environments

**Financial assets:** most resource access in urban areas results from cash exchanges, derived from access to jobs, credit or saving opportunities. The building of financial assets is almost always a key activity for greater livelihood security. For the urban poor, financial assets are often fragile. Most of the urban poor are forced to work long hours in the informal sector with very low incomes. Working in poor conditions such as waste picking serves to increase vulnerability to disease and ill-health.

**Human assets:** cities provide a variety of opportunities for earning income. The benefits from different household members entering into a range of activities based on skills, knowledge and ability increases the chances of sustaining a household. However, some copying strategies serve to increase vulnerability and threaten household sustainability, as for instance, child labour creates barriers to adequate education.

**Social assets:** this refers to the social networks, membership of groups, relationship of trust, access to wider institutions of society upon which people draw in pursuit of livelihood. Low income urban settlements are characterised by limited social assets such as lack of extended family structure, established networks of contacts or strong relationships of trust which are readily accessible in the rural setting.

**Political assets:** this includes participation and empowerment. While participation implies active involvement by the population, empowerment refers to the expansion of peoples' capabilities to define and set their own goals and objectives, assess the implications of choices available to them and assume responsibility for actions to achieve their agreed-upon objectives. Participation and empowerment are therefore mutually reinforcing and enable people to assume their rights and responsibilities as citizens. In practice, any attempt to enhance people's access to assets and to transforming structures and processes will rapidly confront political issues. Having a say in democratic processes is therefore a vital asset in sustainable livelihoods.

The Department for International Development's (DFID) Natural Resources Advisers conferences held in 1998 and 1999 (Carney, D., 1998 and Ashley, C. and D. Carney, 1999). discussed the part the livelihoods approach might play in the battle against world poverty and observed that livelihoods approach can improve the quality and relevance of programmes committed to poverty reduction, and that there was no distinction between rural and urban population in the application of livelihoods approach. They defined sustainable livelihoods (SL) as:

"A way of thinking about the objectives, scope and priorities for development, in order to enhance progress in poverty elimination. SL approaches are underpinned by a set of principles, draw on many tools (including the SL framework) and can be applied in different ways."

The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) has also since 1991, through its Community Adaptation and Sustainable Livelihoods programme, been trying to understand how people in the developing world can escape from poverty and build a sustainable future for their children (IISD, 1999). The program is currently testing a method called **appreciative inquiry** which gets a community to focus on achievements rather than problems, and seeks to go beyond participation to foster inspiration at the grassroots level. Once local people have created a vision of what is possible, they must communicate it to officials in government and business if they are to participate in decision-making. The program is helping them achieve this goal through community-based media, where local peoples, development professionals and journalists together design media productions in a participatory workshop. When the productions are played to focus groups of government

and corporate officials, they can stimulate more equal and effective communication between a community and decision-makers.

Thus while various tools may be used to achieve poverty-focused development activity, the process is underpinned by the following core principles:

**People-centered:** sustainable poverty elimination will be achieved only if external support focuses on what matters to people, understands the differences between groups of people and works with them in a way that is congruent with their current livelihood strategies, social environment and ability to adapt.

**Responsive and participatory:** poor people themselves must be key actors in identifying and addressing livelihood priorities. Outsiders need processes that enable them to listen and respond to the poor.

**Multi-level:** poverty elimination is an enormous challenge that will only be overcome by working at multiple levels, ensuring that micro-level structures and processes support people to build upon their own strengths.

**Conducted in partnership:** with both the public and the private sector

**Sustainable:** there are four key dimensions to sustainability namely: economic, institutional, social and environmental sustainability. All are important and a balance must be found between them.

**Dynamic:** external support must recognise the dynamic nature of livelihood strategies, respond flexibly to changes in people's situation, and develop longer-term commitments.

From the above principles it is evident that SL approaches demand collaboration between sectors and different disciplines as well as continuing learning experience. However, what is most important is to distinguish between the coping and adaptive strategies of the populations being targeted. Many mistakes have been made in the past when solutions to poverty alleviation have been based on coping strategies rather than adaptive strategies. The coping strategies are often short-term response to an epidemic or emergency situation such as civil war, flood or drought by the people. Whatever actions they take if replicated in projects would be tantamount to providing short-term **coping strategies** or **refugee solutions** which are unlikely to be owned by the people for a long time. It is thus necessary to determine the adaptive strategies which entail a long-term change in behaviour patterns as a result of changing circumstances. For instance, the fact that people live in unplanned settlements arises out of changing economic facts of housing shortage and lack of affordability. The non-use of toilets in the unplanned settlements is a coping strategy because the toilets are not there but not because people consider it a cheaper alternative. People in unplanned settlements require affordable housing, and often have good ideas about how best such housing can be provided. Similarly, while informal sector is an alternative employment, working longer hours or picking solid waste without protective clothing is a coping strategy and not an adaptive strategy worth glorifying in sustainable livelihoods.

## **2.5 Review of Shelter Development Concepts**

This literature search is a very vital component in understanding the experiences, impacts and lessons learnt from urban shelter development projects in Kenya. The examination of shelter problems should be situated within the context of an international perspective of the shelter question, which has undergone four stages since the 1960s. Firstly there was the **problem** phase when unplanned settlements were treated as eyesores by the political elite, and viewed as potential areas for breeding political revolution for the newly independent African states. These unplanned settlements were described as squatter settlements when they occupied land illegally. The land could belong to a public body or a private individual. The main feature is that such settlements were not authorised

under the planning regulations and were therefore illegal. Even a landowner could carry out illegal developments which do not conform to planning requirements. Since such settlements did not conform to planning regulations, they were in many cases a health hazard, particularly due to overcrowding, lack of the required infrastructure and unsuitable building materials.

Kenya like other countries responded to this problem by demolishing the unplanned or squatter settlements in the urban setting. It was a noble intention that each family should be provided with a decent dwelling conventionally provided through public sector intervention in the form of rental, tenant purchase or mortgage housing programmes (Syagga and Olima, 1999). Like the demolitions which, were quite brutal, housing developments were carried out autocratically without reference to the intended beneficiaries during the planning phases. This top-down development strategy continued until the rebirth of civil society in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

The second phase was the **solution** phase, which was promoted by John Turner and others who argued against demolition of squatter settlements. Influential institutions such as the World Bank took the opportunity to translate this change of attitude into projects. This gave rise to the much celebrated two-pronged approach to shelter delivery to the low-income groups in the form of **serviced sites** and **settlement upgrading**. While the site and service schemes referred to the development of plots on new sites with necessary infrastructure and services for a new population, settlement upgrading (also referred to as squatter upgrading) programmes referred to cases where improvements were brought to the existing unplanned settlements through minimal planning to allow for minimal provision of infrastructure and services. Quite often upgrading included provision of access, water and toilets, depending on the costs and affordability levels of the existing population.

Kenya Government embraced this strategy in the 1970s, albeit slowly with the implementation of Dandora Community Housing Project in Nairobi, and the provision of serviced plots by the National Housing Corporation in other towns in the 1980s. However these projects excluded those who fell below 35<sup>th</sup> percentile income as they could not afford to pay back the development costs, so that only 30% of the urban population could take advantage of these schemes (Syagga and Olima, 1999:54). The projects were delivered to the beneficiaries **at the table** through the top-down development strategy, and were in the main concerned with shelter.

The third urban housing development phase involved the **self-help debate**, which arose out of the realisation that the aided self-help housing programmes of the serviced sites did not adequately reach the target groups, and the rate of consolidation was slow due to relatively expensive designs. Most of the low-income beneficiaries lost out in the end to the higher income groups who bought them out for various reasons, but mainly due to affordability issue. This raised the issue of full cost recovery since the subsidies did not benefit the poor. It also led to the preference for settlement or squatter upgrading as a way of providing housing to the low-income groups that would be less attractive to the higher income groups. Thus projects such as the Second and Third Urban Projects of the late 1980s in Kenya had higher proportions of settlement upgrading in relation to serviced plots. However, the delivery system was still largely top-down as a result of failure to develop participatory institutional structures among the beneficiary population.

The fourth phase is the **enabling environment debate** initiated in the 1990s, on realisation that governments are in the act of governance rather than provision of services. Led by the United Nations Agencies and the World Bank it was recommended that governments only provide enabling environments for the production and consumption of shelter in the form of viable policies. This was reinforced with the call for integrating environmental, social and economic policies in development under Agenda 21 (UNCED, 1992, Chapter 8), and the calls by Habitat 11 Agenda for multi-sectoral collaboration between public, private and NGO

sectors as well the need for community participation in shelter development (UNCHS-Habitat, 1996). This calls for involvement of all stakeholders in shelter delivery, involvement of local communities in the formulation of housing programmes, preparation of infrastructure and shelter projects, maintenance of facilities and management of local habitat and emphasises upgrading of unplanned settlements rather than demolition (Syagga, 2000:266).

Within this context of enabling environment Kenya prepared the National Plan of Action for Habitat 11 Conference (GOK, 1995) and has subsequently prepared a revised national housing policy for Cabinet approval to take account of the changing scenario. The plan of action recognises that the human settlements sector consists of a large number of agencies in the public sector, private sector, NGOs, CBOs and International Organisations. Within the public sector the following problems calling for urgent action were recognised:

Weak intersectoral linkages in shelter programmes (segmented sectoral mandates in line ministries, local authorities and parastatals),  
Overlapping responsibilities, policies and strategies,  
Centralised decision-making,  
Lack of an effective monitoring and evaluation system.

The plan of action proposed a number of strategies necessary to achieve a sustainable human settlements development, and inter-alia stressed:

The need to adopt an integrated approach in shelter development,  
The need for firm commitment and adherence to the principles of collaboration within the enabling approach by all actors and stakeholders,  
The need to encourage local participation in decision-making in matters affecting shelter development so as to ensure that all voices are heard in identifying problems, setting goals, mobilising resources and implementing projects,  
The need to strengthen mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation.

The four stages of housing development concepts as well as urban development concepts described above, provide the background against which shelter projects development in Kenya will be examined.

### **3. APPRAISAL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES IN KENYA**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

In Kenya where poverty is a reality (GOK, 1998), the thinking behind urban development projects aimed at benefiting the poor was for a greater part influenced by the **basic needs** approach which dominated the international thinking in the 1970s. Distribution of the benefits of economic growth was to be achieved through meeting the basic needs of the poor by providing improved housing and associated services, especially water and sanitation. The projects also included components for improving the productive capacity of the poor through provision of space for income generating activities and allowing subletting of the improved housing. Initially the projects received considerable public subsidies particularly during the problem and solution phases of shelter development until the onset of **full cost recovery principle** in the 1980s. The projects which were largely donor-driven, were not only designed by professional elites but also implemented using limited processes of consultation and presentation of information on project components and their implication. This paper uses the following eight shelter projects developed since 1975 in the context of

changing housing paradigms to evaluate to what extent the projects in Kenya have incorporated sectoral, multi-sectoral or integrated or sustainable livelihood approaches to urban development, and to what extent is there need to embrace the concept of sustainable livelihoods.

### **3.2 Dandora Community Development Project**

The Dandora Community Development Project, usually called the First Urban Project, was a collaborative effort between the World Bank, the Government of Kenya and Nairobi City Council to meet the needs of low-income housing population in Nairobi. The Nairobi City Council provided the 350 hectares of land and the construction funding was provided by the Kenya Government and a credit from the World Bank.

The project, which was largely conceived by the housing sector started in 1975, involved the provision of infrastructure including sewer connections, water supply, refuse collection facilities, roads with surface water drainage, street lighting and open spaces; 6,000 serviced plots (each 120 square metres with built toilet and shower); 4 primary schools, 2 health centres, 384 market stalls, a sports centre, workshops and shopping areas; materials loan fund to enable plot allottees to borrow appropriate amounts for building materials.

#### Project Objectives

The project was a site and service scheme developed during the solution phase of the shelter question after the realisation that the public sector could not provide conventional housing in sufficient numbers at affordable prices for the majority low income urban residents as had been generally assumed during the problem phase of the shelter question. It was conceived as a pilot project for the Kenya Government and local authorities to be able to evaluate the role and potential of such projects for other urban centres in Kenya. The project was intended to benefit low-income households who were expected to spend 25% of their income on housing. Essentially, 95% of the plots were for those in the lowest income groups, while 5% were to benefit all other income groups through sale at market prices to cross-subsidize about 50% of the plots. It was also intended that Nairobi City Council would through this project acquire the necessary ability to deal with the pressure of urbanisation, not only by improving its management procedures but also by improving its own finances.

#### The Implementation Process

Nairobi City Council formed Dandora Community Project Committee and Dandora Community Development Department to design and oversee the project implementation. The Committee gave approval to the project to proceed in October 1975 using the Grade 11 building by-laws which are more relaxed in standards than the more stringent Grade 1 by-laws. However, when the drawings were circulated at the City Hall comments received in May 1976 did not agree with all the design proposals, particularly the standards for the sewers, water supply, roads and ventilation which they insisted must conform to the Grade 1 by-laws. The arguments that ensued caused a delay until January 1977 when the plans were accepted by the City Hall that it was too late to change the design. In 1978 the Department was expanded and renamed Housing Development Department (HDD) within Nairobi City Council to implement Dandora Project and all other low-income housing development projects in Nairobi with its own technical, finance, legal and community development divisions. The aim was to make the Department semi-autonomous but the legal operations of the Council were not amended to reflect this.

The Department solicited applications for the residential plots in the press and carried out allocations using the criteria approved by the Council, the Government and the World Bank for Phase 1 of the project consisting of 1000 plots. It worked with local and international agencies, notably the Catholic Church, National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) and UNICEF to help orient and train allottees, assist them in developing institutions such as building groups and other programmes to create a community in Dandora and enhance overall quality of life of the community.

Phase 11 comprising 5000 plots was delayed until 1982 due to disagreement of HDD and other City Hall Departments on the design criteria. The City Council in 1982 did midcourse replanning to upgrade the design of essential infrastructure, public amenities and community facilities throughout the whole of Phase 11 to a standard comparable to other nearby housing estates. This considerably increased the development costs, which were to be passed on to beneficiaries. It was also decided to increase the proportion of market sale plots to 20%. The allottees were given 18 months to complete their houses, contrary to the underlying principles of progressive housing which is supposed to be piecemeal according to the financial circumstances of the allottees. Market stalls and commercial plots were sold to non-target population.

### Project Impact Assessment

The Dandora Project though applauded by the World Bank Appraisal Report (1978) as being successful in cost recovery by the beneficiaries, in a later evaluation by Saad Yahya and Associates (1988:pp5) it was reported that the project fell short of its objectives in the area of cost recovery for the shelter component and building materials loans. However it was generally accepted that the project resulted in a significant additions and improvements to the housing stock of Nairobi, and in the largely needed expansion of the city's sewerage system.

Institutionally, the Dandora project was for the first time implemented without direct involvement of either the Central Government or the National Housing Corporation, hence giving independence to local authorities. The project was also essentially sectoral. The Council passed the responsibility to a single department to carry out all the secretarial, legal, technical and financial tasks. As expected the traditional departments of the Council did not co-operate with the HDD. Other council departments, particularly the Public Health and the Municipal Engineer were not sympathetic to any lower standards. As observed by Lee-Smith and Memon (1988), the conflict led to halting of implementation of Phase 11, with complete redesign resulting in new expenditures of Shs. 25 million. This had far reaching implications for the residents of Phase 11 in terms of higher charges. It is therefore no surprise that while 99% of the beneficiaries in Phase 1 did in fact build the required 2 rooms on their plots, 35% of the beneficiaries in Phase 11 failed to build and abandoned the project.

Shihembetsa (1986) examined public participation in the Dandora project and found that the project was planned by technical staff in HDD without a survey to determine the felt needs of the people. The applications were solicited through the press when planning work had been completed. The allottees were forced into pre-determined conditions and had no choice in the matter. The people who are supposed to benefit from any project must be incorporated in the whole process, from planning to the final stage of implementation. There should also be feedback from the affected people as implementation progresses as the feelings of the people can change the whole approach. Success should not be determined simply by the number of houses completed but also by how the process has impacted on the beneficiaries.

In his evaluation of Dandora Phase 11, MacInnes (1987) points out the need for one to have an interest in certain more enduring patterns of socio-cultural behaviour of a target population. Thus it was necessary to find out how the targeted population for housing in

Dandora had made a living before moving into the project and how they might be expected to win a living and finance new construction after being resettled on these randomly assigned plots near the periphery of the city. He observes that from an anthropologist's perspective, one would expect many low income beneficiaries to bring with them into Dandora the same cultural perception of their dwelling as a base from which to earn an income as they had done in their previous informal settlements. The new environment did not allow for this kind of activity as the houses were now for single human use which defeated more than 35% of the minimum income allottees. Thus it is imperative that more attention should be paid to the target population's accustomed methods of earning an income and how they might prefer to earn one after resettlement on a self-build plot. Similarly, market stalls and commercial plots should not be pre-maturely allocated to non-target population simply because they have the capital to develop them while the target population remain without source of income.

The lesson to be learned here is that Dandora Project was sectoral and was developed at the time of basic needs approach to development with substantial subsidy. It is not only that the project was not multi-sectoral, but it was also not integrated within the Nairobi City Council as well as pursuing the single goal of providing physical housing stock of beneficiaries. There was an incomplete appreciation of what the project was trying to accomplish, resulting in misunderstandings between the city politicians, senior officers and the project unit. Successful implementation of the project required a great deal of goodwill and understanding by all interested parties, during the planning stage and implementation. This could have been achieved through, multi-departmental approach. There was need to educate all the parties about the importance of drawing a balance between standards and affordability of the target group, thereby placing people at the centre of the project development. Apparently the project was not bought and appreciated by all the approving authorities at the Nairobi City Council, hence the need for greater vertical as well as horizontal integration for a common purpose of improving people's welfare.

An innovative component of the project was the involvement of the people in the financing, building and maintenance of their own houses. The work of the community development staff in the HDD did a great deal to assist the majority of the beneficiaries, particularly in Phase 1 to develop their plots. They encouraged the formation of building groups, and by the launching of a revolving welfare fund in partnership with the Dandora Catholic Church, groups of 10-20 were encouraged to register as societies and pool their savings, so that the monthly contributions were used to build one plot at a time. This shows that the credit provided for material loans though not sufficient provided a catalyst for mobilising low-income savings into productive housing. It also demonstrates that the poor can and often do succeed when genuine assistance is accorded to them. But above all, the project though sectoral in design, demonstrates the impact of multi-sectoral collaboration between the HDD, the NGOs and other agencies in community mobilisation and the realisation of the success of the project. What was not achieved, however, was the involvement of the target group at the beginning to take advantage of indigenous knowledge and the setting out of priorities by the group as pointed out above. It also did not involve other stakeholders in the council.

In summary, the Dandora project was implemented at a time when the concept of basic needs was more pronounced than sustainable livelihoods, so that what was important was provision of affordable housing to the lower income groups. Its impact therefore was verifiable in terms of numbers of houses built and not how many low-income groups have improved their livelihoods in a sustainable manner. The project was donor-driven and was more concerned with cost recovery issues rather than whether the target population was better off than before the project. It would therefore have been necessary to prepare the project design and implementation with certain verifiable indicators in the context of

sustainable livelihoods. It would also have been necessary to involve other departments such as Public Health and Education.

### **3.3 The Second Urban Project**

The Second Urban Project was implemented to continue Bank support in the urban areas initiated under the First Urban Project at Dandora in Nairobi. The conceptualization and planning of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Urban Project was informed by the “basic needs” concerns as well as the self-help debate. It was considered politically crucial to integrate the urban poor through packages of project components that improved their access to services and shelter. The project introduced upgrading of squatter settlements as an official policy in addition to the provision serviced plots.

The Second Urban Project was to be implemented in the three largest towns of Nairobi (Mathare North and Kayole Site and Service Projects), Mombasa (Mikindani and Miritini Site and Service and Chaani Upgrading Projects) and Kisumu (Migosi Site and Service and Manyatta Upgrading Projects) because they dominated the urban shelter problem and the implementation of urban housing policy in the country.

#### Project Objectives

The Second Urban Project was to increase the supply of sites and serviced plots, introduce upgrading of unserviced squatter settlements as an official policy to complement the sites and services, stimulate and encourage employment and income generating activities for the urban poor, demonstrate an effective low-cost delivery system for health, nutrition and family planning services, and strengthen institutional capabilities of Government and local authorities for implementing and managing urban development. The outcomes would be verified in terms of numbers of beneficiaries, rates of cost-recovery and numbers of institutions created.

#### The Implementation Process

The project was to be co-financed by the World Bank and the Government of Kenya. The initial project identification was done by four agencies namely, Ministries of Housing, Local Government, Finance and the respective local authorities. Preparation of the projects in all the three local authorities was done by a consortium of consultants appointed by the Ministry of Housing. In essence the project was multi-sectoral by involving a number of institutions, and to a certain extent integrated by including a number of components or a set of packages for the target beneficiaries (serviced plots, squatter upgrading, employment opportunities, nutrition and family planning). The project was designed by the central government in Nairobi and implemented by the new departments (the Housing Development Departments) established in the three local authorities. However, there was no evidence that adequate opportunities for community participation and consultation were ever accorded to the beneficiaries.

As an integrated project, the Department of Housing in the Ministry was designated as the agency around which inputs to project implementation from stakeholders would be co-ordinated. This responsibility included review and funding of off-site infrastructure and community facilities by the Ministry of Local Government, water and sewerage components by the Ministry of Water Development, land acquisition and valuation by Commissioner of Lands, approval of subdivision plans by Physical Planning Department, provision of power supply by Kenya Power and Lighting Company, review of individual contracts and observance of time schedule by consultants, contractors and local authorities responsible for co-ordinating stakeholders.

## Project Impact Assessment

Although the project started with a high degree of enthusiasm during the preparation and implementation stages, it does appear that the institutions involved did not make adequate use of the lessons learnt in Dandora Project. One major weakness was the inability to provide adequate opportunities for community participation and consultation. The beneficiaries particularly in the upgrading areas were not consulted as regards proposed interventions, and their views, felt needs and aspirations were therefore not taken into account. As is in the case of Dandora, the community development staff employed during implementation phase found it difficult to explain already packaged project solutions to beneficiaries. Not only, therefore, had the main decisions with respect to project design been taken in Nairobi, but also processes of first, consultation, and second, presenting information on project components and their implications, were very limited. Magutu (1997) notes that in the partially settled area of Chaani, consultation took the form of a questionnaire survey of a mere 50 of 20,000 residents, which then appears to have had no influence on project design. Public meetings to inform residents of the imminent project, if held at all, reached very few residents. A preoccupation with loan repayment meant that the Mombasa Municipal Council was not concerned with sustainable livelihoods, hence the transfer of plots from low income allottees to higher income households. Although main infrastructure networks were installed or improved, for example in Chaani, many secondary links were not made because project funds ran out, individual connections have been ruled out by the cost or severe water shortages, and services such as refuse collection, for which the Mombasa Municipal Council is responsible, have not been provided (Magutu, 1997). As with the earlier housing projects, the sites and services and upgrading approach as used in the Second Urban Project was non-participatory. It failed to take into account the livelihood strategies of the poor, and to adjust standards to what they could afford to pay. Although it targeted low-income groups, issues of gender and age were not considered, and the needs of particularly deprived groups such as the elderly, women-headed households, recent migrants and the disabled were not considered. Not only did the Mombasa Municipal Council have little choice over project components and standards, therefore, but the project in practice probably reflected the bureaucratic and technological preferences of many of its staff. Potential inputs from intended beneficiaries were ignored and councilors marginalised except in the plot allocation process. Perhaps well intentioned at the outset, like earlier public interventions in housing, this project failed to address the needs of low-income groups, and most housing for poor residents continued to be provided by landlords in informal settlements.

Another pertinent feature which arises from lack of community participation regarding low income housing projects in Kenya is that planning and infrastructure standards found to be suitable or adequate on one site or municipality may not necessarily be replicated elsewhere. It was for instance, Dandora Project standards that were modified for the Second Urban Project. Standards for Dandora were considered too low for the Kayole site and services plots in Nairobi and in Chaani in Mombasa the standards were regarded as too high and unaffordable to the local people.

Similarly, in their evaluation of the project, among other things, Saad Yahya Associates (1989) observed that social facilities such as markets have become difficult to plan with certainty. The relationship between kiosks, markets, shops and supermarkets is not well understood by planners and more research needs to be done in order to avoid repeating disasters of the recent past. It is necessary to understand why a wide range of retail and other economic activities have sprung up in and between the houses (restaurants, tailors, provision stores, furniture makers etc) in the project areas when they were not consciously planned for, but have now to be tolerated while some market stalls remain

vacant. This means that marketing surveys may be more essential than credit for informal sector enterprises.

The role of the NGOs which made the implementation of Dandora Phase 1 so successful was also to a certain extent repeated in Second Urban Project. At the municipality level, NGOs played a key role in the implementation of community development programmes, which had a positive bearing on the social impact of the project. For instance, in matters of health and nutrition, family planning, community health and child survival interventions, the NGOs and UNICEF made a vital contribution, although they were not involved at the planning stages. They were impressed with the efforts of community staff in Kisumu that began in 1979 that succeeded in getting more people to visit the nutrition and family planning clinics than had been the case before. This success attracted funding from UNICEF and Ford Foundation with the result that the health status of children improved tremendously. There is thus compelling justification for involving NGOs in the formulation of large scale urban investment programmes so that their participation and contribution can be built into the projects, and their impact assessed as part of the project evaluation exercise.

In terms of institutional design, Mombasa and Kisumu were to set up HDDs similar to those like in Nairobi. While it was difficult to recruit staff initially, during the implementation the departments experienced high staff turnover, low morale, inadequate experience and poor working practices. It was difficult for consultants to obtain prompt decisions even on professional and technical matters from the councils. Similarly, upto 1983, one year to the loan closure date, the co-ordination function had not been effective. Land issues remained a constraint in some project sites, with compensation playing a leading role in delaying execution of civil works in Mombasa and Kisumu. Capacity within the Housing Department proved to be a major constraint to effective supervision of project implementation in three local authorities. The Project Monitoring Unit (PMU) which was to be set up in the Ministry of Housing, did not become fully operational until 1984 (7 years behind schedule) when it was merged with PMU for 3<sup>rd</sup> urban project.

As a result the physical planning exercise for all sites and upgrading in particular took longer than anticipated with the result that the project experienced tremendous cost overruns in all components with ultimate actual costs of the projects in Mombasa and Kisumu being 87.2% and 233% higher than appraisal estimates, respectively. It had in fact become necessary to scale down the projects in Mombasa and Kisumu by omitting contractor built wet cores and reduction by standards of walls, drainage, street lighting and water supply. Overall the project sites in the three towns were reduced from 13 to 8, and overall number of plots reduced by one-third.

It may be concluded that although the stock of decent housing in the three cities enlarged under the Second Urban Project, the impact for the poor was hardly adequate to have a downward effect on house prices and rents. The project provided services to a total of 400,000 people in newly serviced and upgraded areas, however due to high quality services the plots those in Kayole, Nairobi were selling their plots at 150% of the development costs (Saad Yahya and Associates: 49). In terms of livelihoods the gentrification that takes place in these projects only help to increase the marginalisation of the poor. The emergence of small businesses and other economic activities in the areas are of course a positive benefit if they are carried out by intended beneficiaries. Furthermore, community participation was grossly inadequate and the communities were in no way empowered. Uncertainties too remain as to projects accomplishments in promoting long term institutional development as rivalries continue between the engineers and treasurers departments on the one hand and the HDDs on the other hand. Given the product mix within this project and the number of institutions involved it would have made a good candidate for poverty alleviation if it had been conceived and implemented in the context of sustainable livelihood approaches that that are people-centred.

### **3.4 Third Urban Project**

This was a multi-sectoral but less integrated project initiated in 1983 as a continuation of a programme of support for Kenya's urban investment policy, which was premised on a basic needs strategy emphasizing investments in water supply, education, health and low-cost shelter. Unlike the Second Urban Project which had components of income generation and health directly incorporated in the shelter project, the main emphasis in this particular project was shelter provision with other aspects being incidental. The project was extended to cover five secondary towns of Eldoret, Kitale, Nakuru, Nyeri and Thika. The project's multi-sectoral components included:

- (a) Servicing of urban public land for site and service projects involving 2441 plots in Eldoret, Nakuru and Nyeri to be allocated to the public on agreed criteria;
- (b) Servicing of private land involving 3631 plots in Eldoret, Nakuru and Thika by the respective councils and recover the costs through land owners;
- (c) Joint venture development between council and private developer involving 831 middle-income housing in Eldoret;
- (d) Settlement upgrading involving 1727 plots in Eldoret, Kitale, Nakuru, Nyeri and Thika;
- (e) Construction loans in some 2000 non-World Bank financed projects in Nakuru, Nyeri and Thika; and
- (f) Community facilities accounting for 8% of the project funding for markets, workshops, schools dispensaries and lorry parks in Eldoret, Nakuru, Nyeri and Thika.

#### **Project Implementation Process**

The Third Urban Project intended to provide access to housing through servicing of land with the necessary infrastructure and community facilities. The capital costs would be passed on to the beneficiaries through loans and running costs to be recovered through user charges as appropriate by the respective local authorities. The development costs were provided to the Kenya Government by the World Bank at 11% interest, which the Government on lent to the respective local authorities at 11.25 % for a similar period of 5 years and 4 years grace period. The councils in turn lent to the beneficiaries/plot holders (construction loans and the infrastructure recovery costs) at 12% for 25 years and a grace period of 2 years. This however, excluded cost of land.

Project implementation documents for the respective councils showed that no special departments were set up as in the case of Dandora in Nairobi. What was done was to appoint a project manager within the Town Engineer's Department to co-ordinate the projects, while drawing on skills from other departments. Additional staff were appointed as necessary. A project-monitoring unit (PMU) was set up at the Ministry responsible for Housing to supervise the projects in the five project towns.

Each council was expected to negotiate with private landowners accounting for 58.5% of the plots to be developed, including the land buying cooperatives in Nakuru and Thika, and privately owned land-buying companies in Eldoret. The remaining 41.5% of the plots were on public land and even then the councils were expected to carry out negotiations with prospective beneficiaries about the planning proposals. Unlike Dandora, however, the local authorities under Third Urban Project opted for project teams that remained fully integrated with the council departments. The projects were co-ordinated by the Town Clerk, his deputy or Town Engineer. Other members of the team included project accountant, community development officer survey assistant, building assistant and co-

opted representatives of the project beneficiaries. The team was responsible to the Project Committee, which was composed of all councillors and chief officers in the council.

### Impact Assessment

An evaluation carried out by Syagga (1989: 61) observed that unlike in Dandora where there were 400 staff in the community development division of HDD, in the present project the recruitment of community development officers was done very late and in few numbers as an after thought. Thus due to late recruitment of community workers, their role was limited to processing applications for the site and service programmes and winning the co-operation of residents in the upgrading areas rather than discussing with them their needs. According to the World Bank (1983:13), community development work is a slow process and has been known to delay project implementation. In order to ensure community participation costs have to be incurred in appointing and training appropriate personnel.

The purpose of community development work is not simply to satisfy the principle of community participation, but more importantly because deficiencies and imperfections are more tolerable if they are one's own responsibility. When dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contribution in provision of housing, both the process and the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being, instead of being barriers to personal fulfillment and a burden on the economy (Turner, 1977). The concern with cost effectiveness of the project that was passed down from the World Bank and the top down planning orthodoxy that has often characterized urban planning in Kenya, meant that very little attention was paid to creating the requisites for ensuring community participation at the local levels. The result of this omission was that in most of the project sites such as Huruma, Mwiya and Kamukui in Eldoret, both leaders and members of the beneficiary land buying companies complained about the poor standards of roads provided, insufficient water supply and insufficient school places in the new school (Syagga, 1989:68). Similarly in Bondeni in Nakuru, the plot owners who were provided with wet cores refused to collect keys from the Council. They reported that they had been using pit latrines previously and paid nothing to the Council. Now it would force them and their tenants to pay for water and sewerage which they may not afford, and yet nobody consulted them on the issue. Consequently the repayment record has been very poor.

The integration of the project work within the existing Council departments prevented 'kingdom building' and institutional feuds that follow the creation of new departments or semi-autonomous units formed specifically for project implementation as was in both First and Second Urban Projects. However, while this arrangement facilitated the co-ordination, it was reported by the project teams that it made it difficult for them to experiment on innovative ideas as they had to conform to established bureaucracy. Similarly, the institutional framework slowed down technical decisions since they required to be endorsed by full council meetings.

Since the formation of PMU in 1984, a system of quarterly central government supervision missions was instituted. The missions which were often joined by World Bank officials reviewed overall progress, identified problems and recommended solutions for implementation by local authorities and other relevant agencies. PMU vastly improved the rate of project implementation through its multi-agency forum for project review and decision making committees. Integrated urban projects require sustained interministerial co-ordination to ensure efficient implementation, so that oversight and technical aspects are carried out without divided attention during the project implementation.

One of the main objectives of the project was to assist in the development of an integrated urban network, which will support economic growth in rural areas and improve the population holding capacity and urban employment base of secondary towns in Kenya. Studies in Latin America by Strassmann (1976) showed that lower income family housing

generates more employment than higher income family housing and that in smaller urban areas housing creates more employment than in larger urban areas. A survey in Eldoret (Syagga, 1989:75-90) showed that each plot would generate 20 man-weeks of skilled work for less permanent structures and 128 man-weeks of work for permanent buildings. More jobs would be created through infrastructure development and supply of construction materials. However, this employment phenomenon lasts as long as the project is still under consolidation. A more permanent feature of employment is the small-scale enterprises from the market facilities including retail and wholesale markets, stalls and workshops, open air garages and lorry parks. Most of these components in the project towns were completed and are in use. However, like in the case of First Urban Project most of the allottees were from outside the target population. Most of the target population would be hampered by the problems of small-scale enterprises, particularly capital and marketing.

One other issue whose impact needs consideration is the access by women to the plots in the project towns. The term access here is understood to mean ownership and control of property by women, whose success will depend on total change of attitudes and practices which encourage or reinforce existing inequalities between men and women in Kenya. However, the data available from women allottees showed that they were of low socio-economic status, a factor that has always militated against women's access to property. They had lower levels of education and few of them had any training in marketable skills (Syagga, 1989:140). One of the allocation criteria was that applicant must have a source of stable income. Overall, however, women were found to own 26.5% of the plots in site and service schemes and 28% of the plots in settlement upgrading areas. However, it was also observed that fewer women than men had been able to develop their plots with permanent houses. This confirms the notion that women have lower capacity to mobilise funds or secure credit for construction unless facilitated. This confirms the observation earlier made under the Second Urban Project that although this project targeted low income groups, issues of gender and age were not considered, and the needs of particularly deprived groups such as the elderly, women-headed households, recent migrants and the disabled were not considered. This therefore reinforces the need to apply the principles of sustainable livelihoods in such projects if the lot of vulnerable groups is to be improved.

### **3.5 Umoja 11 Housing Project**

Umoja 11 like the First Urban Project was a largely sectoral housing and community facilities project developed by Nairobi City Commission (NCC) and financed through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was commissioned for construction in 1985 and completed in 1989. Umoja 1 which was an earlier phase had been commissioned in 1974 and was one of the first core housing units, unlike First and Second and Third Urban Projects which were either site and service projects or a combination of site and service and squatter upgrading projects. Umoja 11 came at a transition when donor agencies were insisting on full cost recovery in housing projects and at the same time exploring ways of strengthening the capacity of local authorities to deal more effectively with increasing housing problems. As a consequence the project had the following objectives:

- (a) to provide low-income housing for owner-occupation with security of land tenure,
- (b) to improve the living conditions of the poor at minimal level of amenity provision,
- (c) to promote non-reliance on sub-letting as a means of achieving affordability,
- (d) to promote full cost recovery without negative effects on NCC finances and avoidance of a negative cash flow, and
- (e) to strengthen Nairobi City Commission's capacity to plan, develop and manage low-income housing projects.

## **Project Components**

The project was planned to provide the following housing units and community facilities:

- (a) 4,048 condominium houses and 358 core houses;
- (b) 10 nursery schools, 4 primary schools, 6 local markets and a community market; a shopping centre, a health centre, post office and playing fields.

## **Implementation Process**

The institutions involved in the implementation were Kenya Government, NCC, USAID and consultants (architects, engineers, planners). The Nairobi City Council (NCC) was the borrower and project manager. All the implementation work on the project was carried out on behalf of NCC by the Housing Development Department (HDD) set up during implementation of First Urban Project. The HDD had to receive technical approvals for all its projects from the relevant technical departments as well as the relevant Council Committees as any other developer. Communication and management of the process was organised around meetings attended by all partners.

The combinations of requirement for full cost recovery and non-reliance on subletting in the design of low cost housing had never been successfully tried before in Kenya and was an incredible challenge to the designers. The only way these objectives could be reached within the context of permissible planning and building standards was through the introduction of the condominium concept. This allowed several households to share a plot on a condominium ownership basis. Clusters of five or six units were constructed around a common courtyard. Occupants are the sole owners of their home and private open space and share in the ownership of the courtyard and other common areas with the other occupants of the cluster.

A small portion or 8% of the houses were planned to be freestanding core houses to be extended by the owners. These were to be occupied by a slightly higher income group than the condominium owners. The applications were invited through the press and 30,000 application forms were sold. Applications were restricted to those below the median income of Nairobi, which was Shs. 2400 per month, except for freestanding core units. Again unlike the Second and Third Urban Projects its main focus was housing provision and any other matters that are incidental to housing provision. Fewer institutions were also incorporated in the project.

## **Impact Assessment**

The design of the condominiums was intended to prevent subletting and also to preclude higher income groups from buying the plots for speculative developments. Ironically, however, 2/3 of the units were occupied by tenants rather the purchasers at the time of evaluation (Hoek-Smit, 1989). The tenants had a slightly higher income and employment status than the landlords although some 50% of the tenants had incomes below the median for Nairobi. In this context therefore the project has provided access to additional housing for the City, and has enabled the landlords to build assets in the context of livelihoods.

However, the large proportion of tenant occupation which is common with other low-income housing estates in Nairobi raises questions about the concept of owner occupation as a preferred mode of housing delivery. The scenario is that 80% of all urban households in Nairobi are tenants. Letting is unavoidable since better housing for better-off income groups is always in short supply. There is also the issue of relatively high rents relative to low premiums for owner occupation. Equally important is the issue that the condominiums are relatively small while some of the purchasers may have relatively larger families.

According to Hoek-Smit (1989) about 2/3 of the occupants had indicated that the rooms were too small and that the location of the kitchen near the door was inconvenient. They thought the units were suitable for singles and young married couples but not for larger families. Indeed owner occupancy though desirable in asset creation may not necessarily be a priority for low-income households. Earlier consultation with potential beneficiaries was therefore necessary.

The focus of the institutional development component of the project was to stimulate a greater financial and professional independence of HDD. In practice the institutional development efforts of the project were limited to assistance in the implementation process and not much related to the functioning of HDD. It does appear that the ideas concerning institutional development were not clear at the time of proposal. With gradual shift to more sectoral development by the NCC in the creation of HDD there was need to build capacity within institutions. Yet no adequate plan was prepared on the level and type of expertise and training needed (Hoet-Smit, 1989:30).

HDD as an implementing agency faced a lot of problems in the decision making process. The original concept was that HDD would only relate to one NCC committee and would be less dependent on other technical departments for approvals. On the ground all relevant departments and NCC committees are included in the decision making process in matters they did not initiate, yet collaboration depends on the internal relationship between the departments. Similarly, the consultants seem to have shown a stronger leadership role during design stage but not during implementation. The team did not take a strong position against the contractor who provided sub-standard work, had to be terminated, and created a financial debacle with consequential higher costs to the beneficiaries. Project management should follow a well-defined process. The responsibilities of each party should be clear without overlaps.

The observations above still underscore the need for community participation and empowerment in matters that affect their livelihoods. The concept of condominiums though laudable did not appear popular with the beneficiaries. Similarly a project that proposes to bring 4500 households to live together in a neighbourhood raises issues that go beyond one sector and may therefore require a people centered integrated approach or sustainable livelihoods approaches to development.

### ***3.6 Kariobangi Housing and Settlement Co-operative Society Ltd.***

The Kariobangi Housing and Settlement Co-operative Society Ltd. (KHSC) was founded in 1965 by a group of squatters in part of the Mathare Valley. They were occupying privately owned Land Reference No.220/4, measuring 12 acres (approximately 4.856 hectares). After two years of co-operative savings and negotiations they managed to purchase the land from the owner. They applied and were granted change of user from agricultural to residential in 1979 but had been unable to satisfy the planning conditions, including provision of infrastructure so as to obtain individual titles to members. The National Housing Co-operative Union (NACHU) identified KHSC for support in 1984 under the Co-operative Housing Mortgage Programme (CHMP) to be funded by USAID. The Society had 526 members and 290 substandard structures on the land. The population of the area was estimated as 3600 residents (NACHU, 1989). NACHU undertook the design of the project in 1989 and the implementation was agreed to start in 1990 and end in 1994.

#### **Project Objectives**

KHSC is an example of a community-based housing improvement project in a typical unplanned housing environment. It was therefore designed with the following objectives:

- (a) to provide basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, drainage, circulation) and adequate dwelling units to more than 3600 residents of a co-operatively owned unplanned settlement,
- (b) to promote self-help community development as a means of reducing settlement upgrading costs and generating employment,
- (c) to establish a replicable model for privately undertaken informal settlement upgrading projects in Kenya through affordability-based planning and recovery of cost from beneficiaries.

### Project Components

This was an example of a sectoral housing improvement project whose main concern was to provide a model for affordability and cost recovery. The project components included the provision of basic infrastructure (water, sanitation, drainage, circulation) to more than 3600 residents, construction of 564 dwelling units of 2 rooms each, and provision of titles for each dwelling unit (2 rooms) on the principle of condominium, and a shared title to the common parts.

### Implementation Process

The implementation was executed by the USAID as financiers, NACHU as the implementing agency, KHSC Committee as the project sponsors, KHSC members as beneficiaries, Matrix Development Consultants and Provincial Administration (DO and Chief of the area). Matrix Development Consultants was to assist NACHU to achieve maximum financial management, while the Provincial Administration was enlisted to provide security as and when required.

A review of the records of project meetings, however, show that the meetings were held only between NACHU, KHSC Committee, USAID and Matrix. There were no records of concerns about community mobilization as well as understanding the socio-economic characteristics of the residents of the site. It was assumed that the Committee was in consultation with the members and that things would therefore work well on the ground. Tenants were not regarded as party to the dispute. However, even for the resident owners no discussions were held about relocation or alternative accommodation during construction. In effect the community had not been sufficiently mobilised to own the project.

The relationship between the KHCS, its members, residents and the local administration also appeared strained. At a meeting held in 1991, the KHCS members were addressed by NACHU, the Committee and the Provincial Administration and requested to demolish their structures to allow for the construction to proceed. Some members complained that they had not been consulted about the project and even took the matter to court against the Committee. The tenants also refused to move out of the structures so as to leave room for construction. In order to draw public sympathy the residents approached the press (Standard, October 28, 1991) complaining that they were being evicted to make way for rich and influential members to acquire the land. They received support from the local representatives in both the Council and Parliament who had also not been involved in the discussions on the project. The Provincial Administration was also reluctant to use force to evict the tenants for fear of adverse publicity, particularly as this coincided with the period of intensive democratic movements against the single party government in Kenya.

### Impact Assessment

During the evaluation (Syagga and Ondiege, 1995), it was found out that many KHSC members were old (average age of 56 years) and poor with one or more structures. Their vision regarding ability to qualify and make mortgage repayments over a period of 15

years was an important consideration for sustainability. Similarly, the affordability by the majority tenants was also not seriously considered since the project was aimed at owner-occupation. Although the project was a private co-operative venture, cognisance should have been taken of the existence of all stakeholders. Most of the owners were old and were living out of the site. They were also earning very low incomes. The majority residents were tenants who stood to benefit most from improvements. The project should therefore have been centred around them as invariably their ability to pay rents would enable the owners to pay for the improvements.

The project was assessed when it had one year to completion (Syagga and Ondiege, 1995). It experienced delays in the construction of the units arising mainly from internal problems within KHSC. Not all units planned had been started because some tenants occupying the existing structures refused to move out to give way for construction. Only a total of 285 out of 564 housing units (50.5%) had been completed on the vacant spaces out of which only 141 had been occupied. However, the occupants interviewed in the new housing units who were mainly tenants rated them as good and that the rents paid were fair compared to what they had been paying for poorer quality housing elsewhere. Most of them were new residents in the area.

This is an example of a project that did not consider the importance of partnerships. The local political representatives as well as a functional participation structure should have been in place as principal agents of change. The beneficiaries were also not sufficiently consulted and sensitised to the extent that project ownership was at stake. The overall result was that the remaining funds were withdrawn, while the repayment on the completed houses is reported by NACHU as poor since the allottees are not remitting the sums due to KHCS regularly. There are no titles processed as yet as this was only feasible when the project was comprehensively completed. It is thus necessary that whether a project is sectoral or not it requires a multi-disciplinary approach so as to capture important aspects of human well-being that would make it sustainable. Community participation if well nurtured often helps identify adaptive strategies that become beneficial in long-term project implementation.

### ***3.7 The Tanzania-Bondeni Community Lands Trust, Voi***

The German Technical Co-operation (GTZ) as part of its bilateral aid programme in the area of shelter and human settlements has been working in conjunction with the Ministry of Local Government (MOLG) under the project name Small Towns Development Programme (STDP). The STDP aims to enhance the revenue, management and skills base of local authorities. This has led to STDP working with a number of local authorities in upgrading the poor settlements within these towns in recognition that the site and service schemes had not adequately addressed the needs of the poor. Voi Municipal Council with a population of 15,000 and located some 150 km away from Mombasa in Taita Taveta District approached GTZ through the parent Ministry of Local Government to assist it with the upgrading of the settlements in Voi Municipality under the STDP. The Municipality has many unplanned settlements where residents have no secure tenure and therefore no sustainable shelter.

Tanzania-Bondeni settlement was chosen as an entry point for the STDP. The settlement is located in the southern part of Voi Municipal Council along the main Nairobi-Mombasa railway line. It has a population of 5000 most of whom (95%) live in temporary structures. No infrastructure is provided. At the beginning of the project 60% of the residents were structure owners, 30% were absentee owners and the rest were tenants. In terms of gender, 40% of the structure owners and 20% of the tenants were female-headed households. The residents of Tanzania-Bondeni had occupied not only government owned land but also land owned by the Railways and privately owned sisal estate land. It

therefore became clear from the outset that the solution to the settlement upgrading would have to consider the question of land tenure reform as a central concern for sustainability.

### Project Objectives

The objectives of the proposed upgrading project in Tanzania-Bondeni were to:

- (a) Provide security of tenure and create an enabling environment for the target group to improve their houses and their living environment based on their affordability
- (b) Legalize the squatter settlement
- (c) Improve the environment quality in the project area
- (d) Improve the delivery of services to the settlement and surrounding areas
- (e) Increase the Council's land based revenues.

The above objectives were to be achieved within the following guiding principles agreed between STDP, MLG, Voi Municipal Council and the community, namely that:

- (a) The upgrading would be a gradual, step-by-step process to ensure overall participation, education, ownership and sustainability
- (b) All development plans would be negotiated with the community
- (c) External interventions would be in support of and supplementary to the local efforts rather than in replacement of it
- (d) In absence of intermediary community organisations that could speak on behalf of the community, a consultative mechanism would be established to ensure communication between the community, the local authority and the central government
- (e) The necessary mechanisms for cost recovery of the project from the community would be established collectively between the residents and the local authority
- (f) The community would decide on the land tenure system, which would assist in creating sustainable security of tenure for the community.

### Project Implementation Process

This was essentially a multi-sectoral project involving many stakeholders pursuing a single purpose of providing security of tenure and decent accommodation to the target population. The project adopted a multi-disciplinary approach to implementation with involvement of physical planners, land officers, public works officers, social development officers, public health officers and provincial administrators (Mshila, 1999). Partnerships were established with among others, Kenya Wildlife Services (KWS), National co-operative Housing Union (NACHU), Soil and Water Conservation and Pipeline Corporation, NGOs working in the project area and the banking sector. The institutional arrangements provided for three committees at the community, local authority and national levels. At the community level the committee was composed of elected representatives (for structure owners, tenants, youths), the area councilor, the chief and council representatives. At the Council level a technical task force was chaired by the Town Clerk and included council officers, provincial administration, NGOs operating in the area and an STDP representative. At the national level there was Project Promotion Committee which included the relevant sectoral ministries and STDP.

The following steps were carried out in the implementation process:

- (a) A socio-economic survey conducted jointly by GTZ, MLG and Voi Municipal Council principally to identify the socio-economic characteristics of the residents as well as their needs and concerns. The survey also collected the views of councillors, local authority officials, MLG officials in Nairobi and officials of the Ministry of Lands.
- (b) Intensive community mobilisation carried out to increase awareness, knowledge and ability of the community to organise themselves for self-reliance around the upgrading

- project, as well as mobilise all available resources within the community that can be used for desired improvement.
- (c) Development of community governance structures and participatory development of the community organisations trust deed. This was done through formulation of resident committees (RCs) and their registration as a self-help-upgrading group under the Council and the Ministry of Social Services (MSS).
  - (d) Commissioning of cadastral surveys and plans, and familiarising the participants with the physical layout plans and survey aspects of the upgrading project.
  - (e) Commissioning of concept papers and land tenure models as proposals for consideration by participants. This was done with assistance of NGO based lawyers.
  - (f) Periodic consultative meetings between the community and local authority officials to constantly reappraise the project, resolve technical bottlenecks and provide timely responses to community needs.
  - (g) A mechanism was worked out to enable the residents to pay their contributions for the cadastral survey and for other development costs in installments into a special account.
  - (h) Establishment of partnerships with other agencies that had a contribution to make, including NGOs and the banking sector.

### Impact Assessment of the Project

All residents on site were considered eligible to security of tenure, with priority given to the structure owners. The RCs exhaustively discussed the three land tenure models proposed namely, co-operative ownership, individual leaseholds, and the community land trust (CLT). They selected the CLT since it guaranteed security of tenure that restricts possible land speculation. According to Jaffer (1996) the people willingly accepted long term restrictions on sale and transfer of their land in order to remove property from the market. They usually sell because of speculators' pressures or because of basic incapacity to develop the land. Therefore there has to be a package of support around land so as to help the poor to retain possession. This is guaranteed by CLT, which allowed for registration of title under registered society as a charitable trust, which holds the community's land. A management committee of 13 members runs the affairs of the CLT. At least two trustees and two management committee members must be women.

As Jaffer (1996:39) further observes, in the CLT tenure system, the decisions are democratically legitimised, CLT funds and other assets are protected, security of tenure is sustained and building and infrastructure standards are determined by what the beneficiaries can afford. Thus in terms of sustainable livelihoods, the CLT tenure concept in Tanzania-Bondeni Project accorded the beneficiaries one of the critical assets, namely land tenure, required to buffer them against shocks and stresses caused by evictions of those in squatter settlements. Arguably, the beneficiaries could now buffer themselves further against unsuitable housing structures by constructing permanent structures on what was their land.

The project also shows that there is a significant correlation between the level and intensity of people's participation and the success of development activities. However, one should not lose sight of the drawbacks of participatory approach in that it may lengthen the project implementation period, particularly where the community is involved in some form of capital payment. For instance, in the present project, the socio-economic and topographical survey started in 1991, the concept paper on legal possibilities was developed in 1993, and in the year 2000 the Society has only got the allotment letter and is yet to obtain the title. The benefits, however, in the long run far outweigh the costs.

In summary, this project was started in the current phase of thinking in urban development. The principles of partnership and being people-centred have largely been achieved in this project. This is one of the cardinal principles of SL concept that participation

of the target is imperative. In this project participation by all stakeholders has been largely achieved. It would have been an integrated project if the issues had been broadened beyond the mere provision of shelter to the community, like in the case of Second Urban Project where questions of nutrition, child health and family planning were incorporated in the shelter programme. What was also needed in this project is the incorporation of active monitoring and evaluation as well as documentation of the lessons learned and areas for further improvement for sustainability.

### **3.8 Mathare 4A Development Programme**

Mathare 4A is one of the individual slum villages in the Mathare Valley, the second largest slum area in Nairobi after Kibera (Gitec Consult, 1995). The entire area under the programme is 18 hectares entirely built on Government land. A feasibility study carried out by Gitec Consult (1995) reported that the site had a total population of 21,600 or approximately 8000 households. About 90% of the households are tenants, while 10% are structure resident owners. Single households with dependants in the rural areas form 50% of the population, 5% are single women households with children and the remainder are family households. The inhabitants generally belong to the lowest urban income group with a heterogeneous ethnic composition.

#### Project Objectives

The primary development goal has been defined as the improvement of the living conditions of the people in Mathare 4A. The specific objectives are:

- (a) Speedy infrastructure upgrading and improvement of the housing environment with self-supportive administration and maintenance of services and facilities
- (b) Continuous improvement of the housing situation in a process of development from inside with substantial contribution to housing investment from internally generated financial resources
- (c) Preservation and strengthening of the multi-functional residential, social, commercial and economic character of the area.

To achieve the above objectives the following principles were developed as necessary conditions for successful programme implementation and for its long-term sustainability:

- (a) Comprehensive involvement and participation of the target group
- (b) Development preference for the current area residents
- (c) Financial affordability of development measures for the target group
- (d) Relocation requirements to be met within project area
- (e) Combined short-term infrastructure upgrading and long-term improvement housing approach
- (f) Programme body to own the land and structure owners to be compensated
- (g) Residents to contribute to the programme by reliable payment of affordable rent, which rent should be adjusted annually
- (h) Rent income to be utilised for maintenance and administration, and surplus invested in housing improvement.

#### Project Components

The programme will provide road infrastructure, footpaths, sewerage, water, street lighting, garbage collection points, and wet core (shower, toilet, water point, washing slab) for every 10 households; and construction of new houses to be offered on rental basis with subsidised capital costs to the residents.

### Implementation Process

The Mathare 4A Development Programme is a sectoral project sponsored by the Government of Kenya which, has entrusted the Catholic Archdiocese of Nairobi to act as the executing agency, and financed by KfW of the Republic of Germany. The Programme is governed by a Consultative Board with representatives of the Catholic Archdiocese of Nairobi, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing, the Ministry of Lands and Settlement, the Local Administration (District Officer and the Chief), the Nairobi City Council, the elected area representatives and direct representatives of the residents. The day-to-day work on the project is carried out by Amani Trust of the Catholic Archdiocese of Nairobi. The programme started with a Pilot Scheme covering 2.7 hectares with 1700 households which was implemented between 1992 and 1996. The second phase of the project involving the entire Mathare 4A covering a total of 4300 households commenced in March 1997 to be implemented in three stages upto 2001. The pilot phase cost Shs. 122million while the second phase will cost Shs. 420 million.

A functional **participation structure** of the target group with community-elected leadership at all levels is involved in all aspects of the decision-making process in the programme, alongside the Executing Agency in the following manner:

- (a) All existing structures are fully compensated with their monetary value and the land vested in the Catholic Archdiocese of Nairobi.
- (b) The implementing agency organised the target group and other project-related social work to allow for gradual construction of basic infrastructure and shelter improvements. Land gained through more efficient use at the formal housing stage is to be made available for community facilities and economic development areas.
- (c) All tenants whose structures are to make way for the infrastructure are relocated into temporary housing of significantly better quality than the current structures and with the same improved sanitary facilities constructed in the way leave of the infrastructure so that no group is displaced from their social environment.
- (d) The participative structure of the group will determine allocation priorities and also on the number of houses to be retained for renting on a minimum affordable level to cater also for the poorest among the residents.
- (e) After take-over of the structures residents continue to pay the same rent as before. For a grace period of one year former resident structure owners will only pay nominal amount per month for the structures they live in. No resident pays more rent than he/she previously paid for the demolished structure.

### Project Impact Assessment

According to project status report of February, 2000 (Amani Trust, 2000) the infrastructure provision has been completed in 45% of the entire Mathare 4A with the following facilities in use:

- (a) 1500 residential accommodation replacing the old structures. The rate of construction is continuing at 400 hundred per year
- (b) 140 water supply and sanitation facilities as well as garbage collection points
- (c) 30 small kiosks constructed and let out to business people from the area
- (d) A health facility, the Baraka Medical Centre
- (e) 2 kindergartens.

As a result of the above, the living environment is significantly better in the affected areas than in the rest of Mathare Valley. The rents charged by the project compare favourably with rents charged by private owners for poorer quality housing. The project also

has a higher degree of sustainability since the beneficiaries themselves generate the capital for their own development, thus reducing the necessity of subsidies from both Government and donors. The residents pay rent to the project at the same level as before, and the rent is used in the maintenance of the existing less permanent structures initially as well as maintenance of infrastructure developed, and any surplus is used for further housing development. The project also provides employment to the target group during construction of the infrastructure and repair works since 70% of the labour is assigned to the residents. Self-responsibility is also encouraged through the group management of the wet cores.

While the project can be seen to have achieved its main goals, it has met with difficulties in the implementation process arising from the project concept. Many shelter development projects in Kenya whether financed by the Government, donor agency or the private sector through the site and service schemes, settlement upgrading, tenant purchase or mortgage schemes have been on the basis of owner occupation or asset creation. This was the case in all the six shelter projects previously discussed in this document. The rental housing schemes had been previously the domain of local authorities in the 1960s and 1970s but were abandoned in favour of owner-occupation since the onset of site and service schemes and settlement upgrading programmes (Syagga, 2000). The present project was conceived as a rental scheme and was therefore bound to meet with mixed feelings.

The structure owners opposed the project due to loss of their income and demanded to be the rightful beneficiaries and took court action as well as political activism. This resulted in the project being temporarily halted in 1999, while the Government appointed a Task Force to review the project. The Task Force recommended to the Government that the project should proceed as conceived as conversion of the project into a tenant purchase scheme would ultimately not be in the interest of the residents of Mathare 4A (Amani Trust, 2000). Experience from the previous projects show that the resident tenants often lose out to non-residents largely due to increased repayments after improvements. In the present project resident tenants continue to pay what they previously paid.

The strategy of the project to upgrade the area for the benefit of the current residents was a very noble one but it threatened the interests of the slum landlords who have invested in poor unsanitary housing. They are in most cases not residing in the slum areas, and in reality only 8% of the structure owners were resident in the area, while non-resident ones belonged to affluent and influential middle and high income groups within the Kenyan society (Amani Trust, March 1999). Those who were resident were considered as part of the target group. The misunderstanding could be a pointer as to how the community mobilisation was undertaken and how the majority tenants with large representations overruled the minority interests of the landlords. Participatory processes should be able to accommodate minority views in a development project so that decisions are made by consensus; otherwise we fall back to the autocracy of the previous development regimes in Kenya.

The project was essentially sectoral and the efforts to expand its scope to include health facilities and facilities for income generation are incidental. Other sectors such as Ministry of Health, Chamber of Commerce and Industry or any financial institutions were not involved in drawing up projects with appropriate budgetary proposals. Similarly, the project design and implementation were not inclusive and did not take into account the adaptive strategies of all the beneficiaries. The landlords will certainly be worse off than before, while the tenants will have not built any assets against shocks and stresses such as eviction against defaults in rental payments. Indeed a recent attempt to evict tenants with rent arrears recently led to hostility between tenants and project implementers.

### **3.9 The Enabling Housing Standards and Procedures Project (EHSP)**

In Kenya in recent years, housing standards have undergone significant revisions to adapt to the increment housing needs of resourceful but poor urban families following the commissioning by the government of a major Low-cost Housing By-laws Study in 1979 (GoK, 1980). The purpose of the study was to analyse and evaluate the performance of the existing building control system and develop measures to enhance its efficiency. An inter-ministerial and multi-disciplinary committee was constituted in the mid-1980s to devise ways and means to implement the recommendations but its recommendations did not become effective until a national seminar was held in 1990 to highlight the constraints to the 1985 recommendations and to formulate strategies to resolve them. This led to the formation of a Task Force under the Ministry of Lands and Housing which hired consultants in 1992. Following the consultants report the Task Force prepared "Code 92" which was a set of amendments to the building code as applicable to the low-cost housing, and a manual of "deemed to satisfy solutions" were published in 1993 and disseminated particularly to local authorities (Inter-ministerial Task Force, 1993). The revised by-laws were formally gazetted by the Ministry of Local Government in 1995. A number of development agencies have since then promoted the use of these revised standards, particularly in Eldoret, Nakuru and Nyahururu Municipal Councils. Some of the settlement upgrading projects in Kisumu, Mombasa, Nairobi and Voi have also adopted the standards, but only on an ad hoc and project-by-project basis.

The Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) in Kenya has been part of this process since the formation of the Task Force in 1990 and has gained useful experience which enabled it through Shelter Forum, a Kenyan NGO with which it has had long associations as a founder member, to get Kenya included in an international project on code revision and enabling housing standards sponsored by the DFID of the United Kingdom. The project enabled extensive research and dissemination work to be undertaken so as to facilitate the preparation of a methodology for the development, implementation and review of housing standards and procedures (Saad Yahya, 1999).

#### **Project Objectives**

The Enabling Housing Standards and Procedures Project (EHSP) as part of an international project was designed to stimulate the active involvement of low-income housing agents in the development of building standards and their processes of review. The aims and purposes of this project are to establish an appropriate methodology for the development, dissemination, adoption and regular review of housing standards in Kenya, Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom; and enable low-income people to gain access to better legal housing in urban areas, using more appropriate designs, materials and technologies. This is to be done by facilitating low-income housing agents to become more involved in the standards development and review process, thereby simplifying the procedures.

#### **Project Components**

It was envisaged that the EHSP project in Kenya would be implemented through but not limited to the following activities:

- (a) To document the review processes and the changes in standards and procedures recorded, and to share the information through national workshops to explain the revised standards in general and specific innovative technologies which are now allowed,
- (b) To assess the relevance of the revised standards and procedures through interviews with key housing agents and consumers,
- (c) To target women as a separate group in the review process, and encompassing gender issues in the project,

- (d) To field or pilot-test the revised standards in selected pilot housing projects of at least 50 dwelling units in each country, and
- (e) To obtain feedback from agents involved in the pilot phase in order to verify, whether the revised codes have actually made it easier for low-income families to get access to legal housing.

### Project Implementation Process

Work under the EHSP since 1996 has been concentrated on creating an in-depth understanding of the existing knowledge of the revised by-laws, the implications they have for a variety of stakeholders and subsequently, the production of information materials and diverse dissemination activities targeting relevant parties at local and national levels. This has essentially involved one-on-one contacts and workshops with representatives of local authorities, NGOs, Community-Based Organizations (CBOs) and professional associations involved in human settlements.

The project has been implemented in the Municipality of Nakuru in Kenya as one of the six Kenyan local authorities already mentioned above to have embraced the revised building regulations after they were gazetted in 1995. The revised standards are now referred to as Code 95. Demonstration units and other interventions on the subject of affordable standards were begun in seven settlements in Nakuru namely Kwa Rhonda, Kaptembwa, Lake View, Bondeni, Kiratina, Mwariki and Lanet.

### Project Impact Assessment

According to Swazuri (1999) the EHSP project is the first of its kind in Kenya to attempt the practical implementation of the revised building regulations, commonly referred to as 'Code 95'. A similar initiative has been tried simultaneously by Zimbabwe and both projects are undertaken by ITDG. In the Kenyan context this study draws from two evaluation reports by Saad Yahya (1999) and Swazuri (1999) to determine the project impacts.

In terms of poverty impact the project has motivated and assisted a number of people in the pilot area of Nakuru to construct demonstration houses using the relaxed building standards, thereby improving access of the poor to adequate shelter and encouraging local low income inhabitants to mobilise the available resources to better their lives and their living environments. According to Yahya (1999) the project efforts have directly reduced building costs by 30%. What is not clear, however, is the comparison of this cost with what the communities use other than conventional building materials. However, a number of artisans (men and women) have been trained in the use of appropriate building materials and this has enabled many to acquire rare skills, construct their own houses and earn a living through the trade.

In terms of partnerships the project has created a sense of networking and collaboration amongst stakeholders in the built environment, which has rarely been exploited before. The project has shown that the responsibility of housing provision should be shared amongst many parties and only through networking can it be made easier. It has also created awareness amongst the local people, local authorities, CBOs, the government and its departments, NGOs and the general public on the existence, operation and the benefits of relaxed building standards in housing construction, such as reduction in approval times, costs and stress of official bureaucracy. This has influenced other local authorities to adopt the revised by-laws in their areas. The project also demonstrated that local authorities can positively work with other partners in enabling housing construction and shelter improvement if the correct attitudes, mechanisms and networks are put in place. The role of local authorities and central governments as enablers of housing provision has been

enhanced while the other stakeholders take their share of credit in contributing towards access to affordable shelter.

The impact on marginalised groups and gender though not significant is on the right footing. For instance, through proactive involvement of both men and women in the planning and project support initiatives by the project teams, the project area residents are convinced that women can afford to construct houses. Thus three women groups in three project sites have established merry-go-round schemes for their member's house construction enterprises. Similarly, through the project's initiatives there is increased confidence and self-esteem among trained artisans, who otherwise previously operated as a professionally marginalised group.

In terms of sustainability, the participation of the Municipal Council in the project activities and its re-orientation to enabling standards has ensured that there is a supportive institutional framework to sanction approvals and to facilitate technical support to affordable and legal housing after project phase-out. According to Swazuri (1999) the Council has maintained its unique distinction of shortening the time taken to obtain approvals to an average of 4 weeks or less. As indicated above, the production of the type plans and their repository in the Council's design office, the AHC and the respective CBOs has the effect of assuring sustainability of appropriate building designs.

The dissemination of information on the revised codes and the limited demonstration of appropriate building technologies in a few households have generated increased interest (and expectations for support) among the low-income groups in Nakuru. ITDG has made some efforts in linking the groups to partner agencies such as PRIDE-Kenya, Kenya Rural Enterprise (K-REP) and the National Co-operative Housing Union (NACHU). One group, Kwa Rhonda Neighbourhood has been among the first groups to benefit from a housing finance facility from NACHU.

Nationally, the project has led to the formation of an active Affordable Housing Committee to link up the CBOs with partner development agencies, the active involvement of the small but still active artisans association in providing technical support to households and CBOs and the increased participation of youth groups in disseminating information on the appropriate building technologies.

The project has finally formed the basis for the Integrated Urban Housing Project (IUHP) in the three neighbourhoods of Kwa Rhonda, Bondeni and Lakeview in Nakuru (ITDG,2000).While EHSP was largely multi-sectoral and dealt mainly with housing, IUHP will be integrated so as to address issues of environment, sanitation, micro-enterprise, housing and finance and community enablement.

## **4. OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS IN APPLICATION OF SL APPROACHES IN DESIGN OF NEW PROJECTS AND PROGRAMMES IN KENYA**

### **4.1 Constraints**

In Kenya urban development planning has so far been characterised by what has been described as the ***“spread-and-take-up programmes”*** or ***“at the table projects”*** where services are pushed out from the centre and are taken up by the periphery. Within this context the elites and experts normally make the major decisions regarding what is desirable and community participation is normally seen as a means of legitimising what has already been decided upon. This has been the case with six out of eight projects described above. The exceptions are the Tanzania-Bondeni Community Lands Trust in Voi and the EHSP Project in Nakuru. Both projects have adopted a multi-sectoral approach and created

a sense of networking and collaboration among stakeholders. They also involved the examination of the adaptive strategies rather than coping strategies of the target populations. While these two projects were multi-sectoral, perhaps only the Second Urban Project out the eight projects above adopted an integrated approach to development as it addressed issues that are of concern to human well-being rather than shelter alone, such as family planning.

The general observation has been that most shelter development projects in Kenya have been non-participatory (GOK, 1995; Magutu, 1997; Gatabaki-Kamau, 2000). Although they targeted the low-income groups, issues of age, gender, and the needs of the particular vulnerable groups such as the elderly, women-headed households, recent migrants and the disabled were often not considered. The projects considered income as the point of reference and disregarded other aspects that lead to poverty within communities such as empowerment and participation. Potential inputs from those beneficiaries likely to benefit most were therefore ignored. It was also observed that past government efforts at improving the living conditions of poor urban settlers through settlement upgrading programmes that were meant to be self-sustaining and replicable, had suffered from typical shortcomings of over-designed and unaffordable infrastructure; top-down approaches to development plans which did not reflect the residents' aspirations; a high turnover among the initially targeted beneficiaries; tensions between communities; NGOs and government agencies; and weak implementation capacity at all levels Jaffer (1996). This had resulted in the marginalization of the targeted poor and their movement away from the projects; rampant disregard of community obligations linked to physical improvements; and non-recovery of infrastructure investment costs. Urban shelter development projects in Kenya have also been characterised by weak intersectoral linkages arising from segmented sectoral mandates in the line ministries, local authorities and parastatals as well as weak institutional co-ordination thus calling for the need to adopt an integrated approach in development (GOK, 1995:21; 46).

It has been argued that for site and service projects it is difficult if not impossible to involve beneficiaries at the planning stage since they are normally not an existing entity at this stage as was the case in First Urban Project, Umoja 11 Project and elsewhere. However, as observed by MacInnes (1987) in evaluating Dandora Phase 11 in the First Urban Project, the projects know in advance where the target population currently live within the town that would take up the projects. It is therefore possible to reach them through a survey in order to determine their adaptive strategies. It is also argued that while organisation of the target community is a pre-requisite for community participation because it provides a platform, in most cases one finds that there is not a single organisation that covers the interest of the whole target community. Such a community may at best be heterogeneous. Although two or more organisations may exist in a community, they may be complimentary, overlapping or competing. Thus in a settlement upgrading project the interests of the structure owners and the tenants may conflict, while relations between local authorities and illegal settlement communities are usually characterised by mistrust (Syagga, 1989:54). Further more, it should be realised that while initially donor funded projects focussed on the basic needs strategy in favour of the poor, the lending policies that came with structural adjustments of the 1980s and 1990s focused more on policy environments rather than poverty. The emphasis was on governments as facilitators, full cost recovery and reduction of subsidies. However, it needs to be appreciated that cost recovery is affected by both the ability of the implementing agency as well as the behaviour of the beneficiary communities. Concern with institutional development should therefore take cognisance of the need to provide for community participation.

As long as the central government as well as development agencies do not have faith in the community to manage implementation of projects and ability to collect revenue through

cost recovery, control of projects and criteria for decision-making are likely to remain centralised which in turn hinders realisation of effective community participation at local level and the realisation of sustainable solutions to poverty alleviation. It is however worth recognising that many development agencies such as United Nations, DFID, ITDG etc, have come to recognise the role of indigenous knowledge of the communities in development and are thus making appropriate strategies to harness the same.

#### **4.2 Merits in the use of SL approaches**

Given the genesis of sustainable livelihoods (Ashley and Carney 1999) there could be many interpretations of SL. Is it a tool, an operational objective, a set of principles applicable to any situation, or an approach to development combining various elements of principles, objectives and tools? SL is the ability for the people to make a living and improve their quality of life without jeopardising the livelihood options of others, either now or in the future. Thus SL may look similar to many traditional development approaches (basic needs approach, community development, integrated development, etc), its added value is that its concept and methodology approaches poverty in a sustainable manner. It considers long-term sustainability as well as assets and entitlements beyond income. Sustainable livelihoods approaches therefore refer to a set of principles, backed up with a set of tools aimed at long-term alleviation of poverty. While the SL principles have been clearly set out, the tools may be many. Among the tools are DFID's SL framework or checklist of analysis grounded in livelihood assets and the structures and processes that transform these assets the IISD appreciative inquiry method in which potential beneficiaries concentrate on their achievements rather than their problems, or any other participatory or rights-based approaches. The SL principles therefore incorporate and complement key tenets of other development approaches, but encourage sectoral goals to be defined and designated in terms of impacts on people rather than simple direct outputs. The SL approach is in fact more of a process than a methodology with various iterative stages and feedback to the various component parts.

What has made it difficult to appraise the urban shelter projects in Kenya in terms of livelihoods is that the verifiable indicators were conceived basically in terms of numbers of outputs rather than livelihood outcomes. What makes people's lives better such as ability to participate in democratic processes and as change agents are considered less important in project planning and implementation. Thus whether projects are initiated sectorally, multi-sectorally or integrated, these are simply entry points. What is important is that programme development starts not with community needs assessment but with community strengths and assets assessment. This is important in building esteem and self-reliance and break away from top-down development syndrome. Collaboration between sectors, even if detailed interventions are sectorally anchored is essential. Since no single discipline or expert can understand all aspects of livelihoods (technical, economic, institutional, social and environmental analyses) it needs no stating that the adoption of SL principles incorporates the advantages of multi-sectoral and inter-disciplinary approach to development. It should also be noted that while sector-wide integrated approach is centrally driven within a single planning, management and budgeting framework, SL favours decentralization, smaller-scale area based projects and people focussed change. It supports policy mediation through meso-level institutional linkages such as local government, NGOs and CBOs.

Many early urban shelter projects in Kenya were neither appropriately monitored nor evaluated. Generally, development agencies usually designed the projects to correct problems and fulfill needs in a community which in many cases could be short term solutions based on coping rather than adaptive strategies. An unintended result is that local people often focus on the deficiencies in their community. This process can disempower a

community, making it difficult to sustain the results of a project after funding ends. In contrast, SL approaches require on-going learning through implementation and therefore highlight the importance of monitoring and evaluation based on verifiable indicators negotiated with the community and other stakeholders at the outset of the project, but taking care that expectations to be monitored are not inflated. The indicators should include a range of livelihood impacts (impact on other assets, activities, structures and processes) to be monitored, and that differences both within and between households are clearly brought out through socially differentiated monitoring.

## **5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **5.1 Conclusions**

From the above review a clear distinction can now be drawn between sectoral, multisectoral, integrated and sustainable livelihood approaches to development. In the first instance, sectoral projects are initiated, planned and implemented by particular portfolio institutions or agencies, mainly because of limited resources relative to the existing or potential demands. It is thus sometimes more practical and cost-effective to limit resources to selected sectors where the problem is acute and the conditions are promising for getting results than to spread the available resources over a large part of the economy. Its drawback is that it relies heavily on the goodwill of other service providers who do not regard themselves as party to the project. It is concerned with narrow issues that affect human well-being since by excluding others from initial stages of planning it cannot claim to have the competence in many areas within one sector. As has been shown in the Kenyan context, sectoral projects do necessarily concern themselves with sustainability.

A multi-sectoral project on the other hand involves all strategic partners in determining how the programme affects issues within their own sector's purview, and how it is likely to affect their own sector's plans, objectives and goals in the future. Thus the analysis, priority setting and planning takes place across all sectors when the programme is being conceived through an open, participatory and inclusive process, involving government, NGOs, the private sector and communities. It should particularly recognize that people targeted, as beneficiaries possess the key elements of response and should be involved at all levels and phases of plan development. However, while multi-sector projects are multi-disciplinary, participatory and decentralised, like the sectoral projects they are single goal-oriented and thus do not cover in each case many issues concerned with human well-being. They may also concern themselves with short-term solutions based on coping strategies rather than sustainable solutions based on adaptive strategies.

Integrated projects differ from multi-sector projects in that all the sectors involved need not work towards a single goal. An integrated project involves a package of services, issues or different projects in a target population based on their participation and priority setting. Each sector will develop its own sub-project within the programme with different perspectives or goals. Its drawback is that it may lead to population fatigue if not properly co-ordinated. Care should also be taken that adaptive rather than coping strategies become part of the solutions for sustainability.

Sustainable livelihoods projects if successfully executed will combine all the advantages of basic needs approach, participatory development, community development, sustainable resource utilisation, sectoral, multi-sectoral and integrated development approaches. However, in dealing with anti-poverty, the above approaches have used consumption measures with little attention paid to the manner in which people live, the resources used in pursuing livelihoods or the human costs involved in the implementation of

such programmes. Cases of demolition and compulsory acquisition of land for shelter projects is a common phenomenon in Kenya without due regard to the immediate sufferings of displaced population. Actions taken, for instance, in Mathare 4 Project and the attitudes adopted in Kariobangi Project are typical cases of resettlement problems in Kenya. SL on the other hand considers long-term sustainability as well as assets and entitlements beyond income or consumption measures. SL projects should embrace the activities, entitlements and assets by which people make a living. The assets as already pointed out are all inclusive, and access to them, their use and interaction among them serves as the foundation of a livelihood system. The next section on recommendations provides a brief description of how a sustainable livelihood project would be executed.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

In terms of shelter development it has long been assumed that the two critical factors for sustainable livelihoods for the urban poor are income and secure tenure. However, it is now conceded that other factors such as social networks, participation and empowerment, health and nutrition as well as infrastructure and social amenities, etc., are of course important for the total well-being of a person. Inability by the poor households to build these respective assets increases their vulnerability and perpetuates their poverty. But there are barriers or influences (structures and processes) which hinder the poor from accessing resources which in turn determine the level of services received as well as level of assets built overtime and therefore the degree to which the households can sustainably withstand shocks and stresses. Any form of poverty eradication can only be successful if it is able to describe how people obtain these assets, what they do with them, what gets into their way whilst obtaining them and who controls the resources on which the assets are based. The solutions will rest with the people whose adaptive mechanisms should be harnessed, facilitated and appropriately improved at the intra-household and inter-household levels. It is in this context that this paper encourages the use of the sustainable livelihoods (SL) approaches to development, which though may appear slow and costly in the beginning, are systematic and able to open and heal the wounds of poverty if executed through the following steps:

- (a) Assess the community strengths and assets as well as risks through participation of all project stakeholders,
- (b) Analyse the national, local and sectoral policies that influence the target population's livelihoods,
- (c) Assess and determine the role of appropriate technologies that can improve indigenous knowledge in the achievement of livelihoods,
- (d) Identify the social and economic investment mechanisms that may facilitate or hinder existing livelihood strategies,
- (e) Ensure that the above four stages are integrated and interactive in real time so that information gathered within each step is fed into the other component parts.
- (f) Develop with all stakeholders a system of monitoring and evaluation using verifiable indicators that capture a wide range of assets that determine human well-being.

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